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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 910164 
v. : 
KENNETH GLENN ROBERTS, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated assault 
by a prisoner, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103.5 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1991), 
because the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case 
involving a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court deprive defendant of a due 
process right to present his defense when it ruled as a matter of 
law that the defense of compulsion was not available to him? 
Because the court ruled as a matter of law that the evidence was 
insufficient to allow evidence of the defense, the issue is a 
legal conclusion and reviewed for correction of error. State v. 
Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine that the 
defense of compulsion was not available to defendant in this case 
as a matter of law? This issue is a legal conclusion which is 
reviewed for correction of error, but any subsidiary factual 
determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah April 23, 
1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 30, 1990, defendant was charged with 
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990); and aggravated assault by a 
prisoner, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-103.5 (1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 6-8). 
Trial was set originally for November 26, 1990, in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Scott Daniels, judge, presiding (R. at 18). On November 30, 
1990, trial was re-scheduled for January 22, 1991 (R. at 19). On 
January 9, 1991, defendant filed a subpoena for the director of 
the Utah State Department of Corrections (R. at 20). Five days 
later, counsel for the director filed a motion to quash the 
subpoena on the bases of improper service and unreasonableness 
(R. at 22-32). Also on January 14, 1991, defendant filed 
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum for eight other individuals 
involved in the Department of Corrections (R. at 33-40). At a 
hearing conducted on January 17, 1991, Judge Daniels granted a 
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motion to quash all of the subpoenas and granted defendant's 
motion to continue the trial (R. at 41). The court also ruled 
that the evidence and witnesses sought by defendant through these 
subpoenas were irrelevant to defendant's case and that the 
defense of compulsion was not available as a matter of law in 
defendant's factual circumstance (Transcript of hearing 1/17/91 
[hereafter T.] at 19-20; a copy of the transcript is attached as 
the Addendum). On March 8, 1991, defendant entered a guilty plea 
to aggravated assault by a prisoner, conditioned on taking this 
appeal of the court's prior ruling (R. at 80 and transcript of 
hearing 3/8/91 at 3-4). Defendant was immediately sentenced to a 
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison, to be served 
concurrently with the sentences he was already serving (R* at 
88). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this matter are contained in the 
Statement of the Case and the body of the brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's right to present his defense is not an 
absolute right. If he has not proffered or presented sufficient 
evidence of the elements of the defense to raise it, the trial 
court may, as a matter of law, preclude defendant from presenting 
the defense. 
The evidence proffered by defendant did not meet the 
elements of the defense of compulsion; consequently, the defense 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF 
ANY DUE PROCESS RIGHT BY RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENSE OF COMPULSION WAS NOT 
AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT• 
Defendant first claims that he was deprived of a due 
process right to present his defense when the court determined as 
a matter of law that the defense of compulsion was not available 
to defendant in this factual circumstance. "Under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions 
must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We 
have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that 
criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense.'1 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 
479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984). This right was recognized 
by this Court in State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981), when 
it said: 
[W]e start with the proposition that the 
defendant's right to present all competent 
evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed 
by the due process clause of our State 
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, as well as our 
Federal Constitution, 14th Amendment. It is 
also axiomatic that where the defendant has 
asserted a defense to justify or excuse the 
criminal charge, and where there is 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support 
it, the viability of the defense then becomes 
a question of fact and the jury should be 
charged regarding it. Where, however, there 
is no reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support the defense or its essential 
components, it is not error for the trial 
judge to either refuse to instruct the jury 
as to the defense, or to instruct them to 
disregard it. . . . 
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The question for this Court to determine 
is whether there was sufficient credible 
evidence in support of the defense of 
compulsion to justify instructing the jury 
thereon. 
Id, at 34 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In State v. 
Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), this Court also stated: 
It is a basic legal premise that a 
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to 
have his theory of the case presented to the 
jury. However, the right is not absolute, 
and a defense theory must be supported by a 
certain quantum of evidence before [the jury 
may be instructed on it]. 
Id, at 634 (footnotes omitted). While recognizing a defendant's 
right to present his defenses, this Court has also recognized 
that the right is not absolute. Defendant must proffer 
sufficient credible evidence in support the defense to justify 
the defense being presented to a jury, Obversely, if he has not 
proffered sufficient credible evidence to support the defense, 
the trial court may properly preclude him from presenting that 
defense. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a 
similar situation, involving the defense of entrapment, in United 
States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1986). Ortiz had 
sought to assert the defense at trial but the district court did 
not allow him to because there was no evidence to support the 
defense. JTd. at 1163. The circuit court said: 
It is well established that a defendant is 
entitled to have a jury consider any defense 
which is supported by the law and has 
sufficient foundation in the evidence to 
create a genuine issue of fact. . . . This 
right is so important that the failure to 
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allow a defendant to present a theory of 
defense which is supported by sufficient 
evidence is reversible error. • . . Evidence 
is sufficient to put a theory of defense 
before a jury if it creates a genuine factual 
dispute. When the evidence presents no 
genuine dispute, there* is no factual issue 
for the jury, and the district court has a 
duty to rule on the defense as a matter of 
law. • • • 
Just as a court may find entrapment "as a 
matter of law" when the evidence satisfying 
the elements of entrapment is uncontradicted, 
it also may conclude "as a matter of law" 
that the evidence is insufficient to create a 
triable issue. Thus, whether there is 
evidence sufficient to constitute a triable 
issue of entrapment is a question of law. 
Id. at 1163-64 (citations omitted). See also United State v, 
Campbell. 609 P.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 445 
U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1282 (1980) ("If evidence is introduced, but 
it is apparent that all of the requirements of the coercion 
defense are not addressed, the trial court is not obligated to 
allow the evidence to remain for consideration by the jury"). 
The right to present a specific defense is not 
absolute. If a defendant has not proffered or presented enough 
evidence of the elements of the defense to even raise it, the 
trial court has a duty to refuse to allow defendant to present 
the defense. As will be addressed in Point II, the trial court 
correctly concluded that defendant had not proffered sufficient 
evidence of the elements of the defense of compulsion to raise 
the defense. 
At the pretrial hearing on the motion to quash 
subpoenas, the attorney for the subpoenaed witnesses argued that 
the subpoenas had not been served properly because they were not 
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served personally and because they were not served timely (T. at 
4 and 6-7). The trial court found that service had not been 
properly done and quashed the subpoenas on that basis (T. at 19-
20), After the attorney for the witnesses addressed the court, 
the deputy county attorney argued that the testimony to be 
provided by these witnesses was not relevant to the case (T. at 
7-8). In response to this argument, defendant proffered the 
evidence which he intended to elicit from the witnesses in 
support of his claimed defense of compulsion (T. at 13-16). The 
court required defendant to specifically address the question of 
the relevance of each witness (T. at 16). Taking the witnesses 
individually, defendant proffered what each would testify and the 
relevance of that testimony to his claimed defense (T. at 16-18). 
After hearing this proffer of the full testimony that defendant 
expected from the witnesses, the trial court concluded that the 
testimony would not support the claim of compulsion as a matter 
of law and thus was irrelevant. Because the evidence was 
irrelevant, the court concluded that the evidence was not 
admissible and defendant would not be allowed to put it on (T. at 
20). The trial court did not preclude defendant from presenting 
a defense. Based on defendant's proffer, the court determined 
that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. Defendant did 
not seek to elaborate on his proffer or call the witnesses to 
demonstrate that the evidence was relevant; instead, he pled 
guilty and filed this appeal. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
DEFENSE OF COMPULSION DID NOT APPLY TO 
DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
Defendant's next claim is that the trial court 
improperly concluded that defendant's proffered evidence was not 
relevant and therefore, the defense of compulsion was not a 
viable defense as a matter of law in this case (T. at 20). 
The defense of compulsion (also known as duress) is 
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1990): 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense 
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct 
because he was coerced to do so by the use or 
threatened imminent use of unlawful physical 
force upon him or a third person, which force 
or threatened force a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would not have 
resisted. 
Utah courts have not addressed the defense of 
compulsion in the context of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated 
assault by a prisoner. However, language from this Court and 
from courts from other states in prison cases are helpful in 
analyzing this claim. In an escape case, this Court, in State v. 
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986), examined the defense of 
compulsion under the common law and the Utah criminal code. 
Although the legislature "abandoned" the common law when it 
codified Utah criminal law, this Court considered itself "free to 
refer to [the common law] for such interpretive assistance as it 
may offer" when the differences between the common law and the 
code were "largely technical." JDd. at 633. Finding the 
differences between common law and the criminal code in the realm 
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of the defense of compulsion or duress to fall within this 
category, this Court sought guidance in the common law for 
analyzing the use of this defense. This Court found no Utah 
cases construing the defense in the context of an escape charge; 
however, it approved the trial court's reliance on cases from 
other jurisdictions in fashioning a jury instruction 
incorporating this defense. ,Id. Specifically, this Court 
approved the use of a test delineated in People v. Lovercamp, 43 
Cal.App.3d 823, 118 Cal.Rptr. 110 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1974), 
which "has been widely followed since it was published." Tuttle, 
730 P.2d at 633. These other jurisdictions had, like Utah, found 
"that their statutes were inadequate to respond to the exigencies 
of an escape situation." Id. While the present case does not 
involve an escape charge, the exigencies of the kidnapping and 
assault by a prisoner charges also require an atypical review of 
the duress defense. 
In Tuttle. this Court determined that the trial court 
was correct in applying a modified Lovercamp test in instructing 
the jury and affirmed Tuttle's conviction. Id. at 634-35. The 
Lovercamp test approved in Tuttle states: 
[W]e hold that the proper rule is that a 
limited defense of necessity [or compulsion 
or duress] is available if the following 
conditions exist: 
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific 
threat of death, forcible sexual attack or 
substantial bodily injury in the immediate 
future; 
(2) There is no time for a complaint to 
the authorities or there exists a history of 
futile complaints which make any result from 
such complaints illusory; 
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(3) There is no time or opportunity to 
resort to the courts; 
(4) There is no evidence of force or 
violence used towards prison personnel or 
other "innocent" persons in the escape; and 
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to 
the proper authorities when he has attained a 
position of safety from the immediate threat. 
Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d at 831-32, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 115. The 
Kansas Court of Appeals adopted and modified this test in State 
v. Pichon, 15 Kan.App.2d 527, 811 P.2d 517, 522-23 (Kan.App. 
1991) (listing jurisdictions which have or have not applied the 
Lovercamp test). The Kansas court modified the first paragraph 
to read, "The prisoner is faced with a threat of imminent 
infliction of death or great bodily harm," in order to comport 
with the statutory compulsion defense in Kansas. Ijd. at 523. 
In a case factually similar to the present one, the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the kidnapping 
convictions of three co-defendants. In State v. Little, 67 N.C. 
App. 128, 312 S.E.2d 695 (N.C.App.), review denied, 311 N.C. 307, 
317 S.E.2d 905 (1984), defendants had seized control of an area 
of the prison in which they were incarcerated. Using weapons, 
they held guards and inmates hostage for nearly forty-eight 
hours. J[d. at 696. As in the present case, defendants sought to 
subpoena the records of the Department of Corrections; however, 
the trial court quashed the subpoenas and ruled that duress could 
not be raised as a defense in that case. Ixi. at 697. Citing 
North Carolina law, the court said "'[I]n order to constitute a 
defense to a criminal charge other than taking the life of an 
innocent person, the coercion or duress must be present, Imminent 
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or impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded 
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not 
done,'" Id. at 698 (quoting State v. Kerns, 27 N.C.App. 354, 
357, 219 S.E.2d 228, 230-31 (1975) (emphasis added in Little). 
The court quoted the Lovercamp test, adopted in North Carolina in 
State v. Watts, 60 N.C.App. 191, 298 S.E.2d 436 (1982), then 
stated: 
It is true that defendants' acts of 
kidnapping and holding hostage prison 
officials do not fit neatly into the scheme 
of things envisioned by Watts* For example, 
the fourth and fifth conditions set forth in 
Watts fLovercamp1 are clearly inapplicable to 
the facts of this case. We need not decide 
if judicial surgery or alchemy is necessary 
to transform conditions four and five into 
useful requisites when inmates kidnap and 
hold prison officials hostage because the 
defendants, in this case, did not even 
satisfy the first three conditions of Watts 
rLovercamp]. 
Little^ 312 S.E.2d at 698. The court further held that there was 
no error when the trial court quashed defendants' subpoenas. 
When defendants sought a subpoena requiring 
production of information about the existence 
of weapons in certain cell blocks, prisoners' 
assaults en other prisoners, and emotional 
and psychiatric complaints of prisoners, all 
with the apparent aim of showing "deplorable 
conditions" at Central Prison as 
justification for the three defendants taking 
prison employees hostage, the trial court 
held that "there is no law to allow the 
defense of duress or coercion in this case on 
this charge of kidnappingf•] • • . The trial 
court correctly held on the facts of this 
case that the general prison conditions at 
Central Prison provided defendants with no 
defense to the charge of kidnapping and 
holding hostage prison officials and inmates. 
Id. at 699 (emphasis in original). 
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The first condition of the Lovercamp test is that 
"[t]he prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, 
forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the 
immediate future." This condition translates to "was coerced 
• . . by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical 
force upon him or a third person" in the Utah compulsion statute. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-302. As the Arizona Court of Appeals said 
in State v. Lamar. 144 Ariz. 49()f 698 P.2d 735, (Ariz.App. 1984): 
Duress envisions a third person compelling a 
person by the threat of immediate physical 
violence to commit a crime against another 
person or the property of another person. 
Id. 144 Ariz, at 497, 698 P.2d at 742. The Alaska Court of 
Appeals in Betzner v. State, 768 P.2d 1150 (Alaska App. 1989)f 
stated: 
"Duress must consist of threatening conduct 
which produces in the defendant a reasonable 
fear of immediate or imminent death or 
serious bodily harm. Threatened future death 
or serious bodily harm does not suffice." 
Id. at 1155 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook of Criminal 
Law § 49 (1972)). See also United State v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 
922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied. 445 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 
1282 (1980) ("Basically a defense of duress or coercion requires 
that there be an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm 
which requires the defendant to commit the criminal act, and it 
must be in a situation in which there was no opportunity to avoid 
the danger"). 
Defendant in the present case, just as the defendants 
in Little, has failed to meet the conditions set out in 
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Lovercamp. The first condition, as modified to read the same as 
the compulsion statute, is that defendant had to show that he was 
coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force upon him or a third person• When proffering the 
evidence supposedly to be gained from the Department of 
Corrections officials, defendant said that his defense was one of 
compulsion (T. at 13). He claimed that he had been incarcerated 
"under rather incredible and strict scrutiny11 (T. at 14); he had 
requested "relief from the physical and safety threats that ha[d] 
been made against him during primarily the eight years since [his 
last conviction]"; those threats were from other prisoners (T. at 
15); certain witnesses could testify about their knowledge of 
certain threats made against defendant, and the investigation and 
disposition of defendant's complaints about those threats (T. at 
17). Defendant never alleged that there was "the use or 
threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a 
third person" at the time he committed the kidnapping and 
assault. Because there was no immediacy to the threats defendant 
complained of, the trial court correctly determined that 
defendant had not demonstrated that the defense of compulsion was 
viable in his case. 
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate that there was 
no time for complaint to the authorities, although he did allege 
that there was a history of futile complaints. Giving him the 
benefit of his allegation, he may have met the second condition 
of the Lovercamp test. However, he has not alleged that he meets 
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the third condition. Defendant never alleged that he did not 
have the time or opportunity to resort to the courts for 
protection from the alleged threats. He alleged that he had been 
receiving threats for eight years and had filed complaints about 
the threats with prison officials during that time (T. at 15 and 
17). He felt that his complaints were not being handled 
properly. He never alleged that he had filed any court 
proceeding to seek redress; neither has he alleged that he did 
not have time to do so. Defendant has not met the third 
condition of the Lovercamp test, 
This Court may find, as did the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals, that conditions four and five do not apply in kidnapping 
and assault by a prisoner cases; however, defendant has not met 
all of the other conditions of the Lovercamp test, and 
consequently, the compulsion statute. Therefore, the trial court 
was correct in concluding that the defense of compulsion was not 
available to defendant in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling on the defense of 
compulsion and affirm defendant's conviction. 
1991. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^~"day of November, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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2 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JANUARY 17f 1991; A.M. SESSION 
21 THE COURT: The matter before the Court Is State 
3 of Utah versus Kenneth Glen Roberts. The record will show 
4 that Mr. Roberts is present here personally. This is some 
51 of witness's motions to quash subpoenas; is that right? 
61 MR. MILLER: That's correct. 
7 THE COURTi Mr. Miller, you represent the 
8I Department of Corrections? 
91 MR. MILLER: Yes, and also the people that have 
10J been subpoenaed in the Department 
111 THE COURT: Fine. 
121 MR. MILLER: Do you want their names? 
131 THE COURT: Yes, might as well. 
141 MR. MILLER: First of all it was Gary DeLand, and 
15 subsequent to his—the motion and receiving his subpoena we 
161 received subpoenas for David Franchina, Jerry Cook, Nick 
171 Morgan, Fred Trujillous, Robert Steele, John Glazier and 
18 last night I just realized there is another one for Nola 
191 Phillips. She is not represented in any of the papers I 
201 have submitted but she is also included. 
211 THE COURT: Okay* You can proceed, Mr. Miller. 
221 MR. MILLER: I'd like to begin by stating first 
231 of all that the Department of Corrections and its employees 
24I are not trying to harass or delay the defense in any of 
251 these proceedings. It is merely trying to get the defense 
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II and this Court and its officers to obey the rules of 
21 criminal procedures as they have been stated in the 
31 statute. 
41 Basically our contentions in all of these motions 
51 is that the subpoenas that were issued to the Department 
61 were improperly served in that they were placed in the 
71 hands of people unauthorized to take personal service for 
81 the person that is named. Because of that, we have moved 
9I to quash those subpoenas and we ask that the defense 
101 re-serve those in a correct m a n n e r — i n the manner that's 
111 proper. Again we are willing to cooperate to the best of 
12 our ability, but we also ask the Court make them abide by 
131 the rules as established. 
141 I'd like to also address Mr. DeLand and a few of 
151 the other people that have been subpoenaed. Mr. DeLand is 
161 a very busy man. He is scheduled far in advance of seven 
171 days prior to a trial. This trial, as I have been 
181 informed, the arraignment started on June 15th of this 
191 year. It is now January 17th, there has been a lapse of 
201 several months and we just received these subpoenas less 
211 than eight days ago. In fact it has only been several days 
221 ago. I know Nola Phillips I mentioned—I was just informed 
231 about that subpoena last night because of the process of 
24 the mail within our department. 
251 Trial was originally set for September 24th, 
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continued to November 26th, continued to January 22nd. The 
defense has had plenty of time to serve proper subpoenas, 
but yet they have decided that in the last moment before 
trial they will serve subpoenas that greatly are—or put a 
great burden on the Department and its employees. 
As you've noticed, David Franchina, Jerry Cook 
and Nick Morgan have also been served. Both Gary DeLand 
and David Franchina are the number one and two people in 
the Department. They are asking those people stand at this 
trial doing nothing at work, not able to manage the 
Department in the way that they are supposed to do that, 
and that puts a great burden on them. 
Tou will also notice that both David Franchina 
and Gary DeLand have previously scheduled meetings. One, 
Gary DeLand would be in southern Utah teaching a law course 
for in-service training, and David Franchina is scheduled 
to be at the legislative committee—Law Enforcement 
Legislative Committee, and neither of those two meetings 
can be rescheduled at this short notice, and those 
schedules have been locked in for quite sometime. 
Mr. Cook is the number one person at the 
Institutional Operations and yet he has been subpoenaed on 
short notice. Also, he has only received approximately 
four working days under these. 
THE COURT: When was he served? 
nnirBTTmt»» 
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II MR. MILLER: Yesterday. 
21 MS. WELLS: Hick Morgan was served the 15th or 
3 was it the 17th? 
41 MR. MILLER: All Monday. 
51 THE COURT: Monday? Okay. 
61 MR. MILLER: So we notice we have got a three-day 
71 weekend here. So we have g o t — i f it was served late Monday 
81 he would have received it, if it was properly served, on 
91 Monday, but it wasn't so it would take the mail for all of 
10 these people—takes interoffice mail—they wouldn't receive 
111 that until Tuesday. That gives them Tuesday afternoon, 
12 Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and that's it. Then they are 
131 on the weekend, they are on a holiday. We have got court 
14 on the morning of Tuesday. Under those circumstances, it 
151 is completely unreasonable that the defense has delayed 
16 this many months to subpoena these people and now ask that 
171 this court make them attend this hearing with improper 
181 service. That's basically our contention. 
19 One other contention is Nick Morgan is another 
201 special case, in that—and I guess Nola Phillips would also 
211 be the other one. They have Subpoenas Duces Tecum, which 
221 asked for documents. They are giving us less than four 
231 working days to produce all the documents requested in 
241 their subpoenas. They have had plenty of time for this. 
251 And again, we'll comply with these if we can. But four 
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1 day's notice is a very limited time to comply with these 
2 subpoena requests and that's the Department's contention 
3 and the individual officers. Thank you. 
41 THE COURT: Do you want to add something, Mr. 
51 Skordas? 
6 MR. SKORDAS: If I could, briefly, your Honor. 
71 I think that more important than the fact that 
8 the subpoenas may or may not have been served properly is 
91 the essence of proposed testimony by these witnesses. I am 
101 wondering whether any of them have any relevance at all to 
111 the case at hand. What we are looking at, Mr. Roberts here 
121 is charged with an aggravated kidnapping, an aggravated 
13 assault by a prisoner. I understand the defense is going 
14 to be some sort of compulsion, as I understand it. 
15 THE COURT: Or justification. 
16 MR. SKORDAS: Right. In that he was compelled to 
171 do this because of mistreatment by prison authorities and 
18 other individuals. 
191 I am wondering how many of these people can 
20 really shed any light on that at all, or whether or not 
211 what he is doing here is trying to upset the system, flush 
221 out people, and really continue his kidnapping, his 
23 original charge, by kidnapping these people, so to speak, 
24I and having them come into court and making this circus that 
25 he has created much, much bigger than what it is—he has 
r O M P l T P P P - ^ T r i P n fPPaMCPDTt>rpTnw 
really intended to. 
I don't thin}: under the rules or under the 
constitution Mr. Roberts is entitled to bring in people 
without any foundation, without any relevance to the case, 
without any personal knowledge about the case just so that 
he can put on his little circus act in front of a jury here 
next week. That would be my reason for asking the Court 
not to force these people to come in and testify next 
Tuesday. 
I want to make clear that we are very interested 
and pushing this case along and I would hope that Mr. 
Miller's comments don't lead the Court to think that these 
people need more time, and so maybe we ought to continue 
this trial along. That's certainly the last thing I would 
want to do, and I would meet with their representatives 
personally and hope that we could get the papers together, 
if the Court is going to require them to testify, rather 
than continue it, so their calendars could be worked out. 
But I don't think they are necessary or even appropriate 
witnesses anyway. 
THE COURTi Thank you. 
Ms. Wells? 
MS. WELLS: Thank you, your Honor. 
Tour Honor, first and foremost, if this were a 
civil case in which the defendant were a plaintiff and was 
8 
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1 attempting to bring in witnesses that might be 
21 questionable, I think this court could look at that and 
3 make a determination whether or not these people were 
4 appropriate. But that's not what this is. This is a 
5 criminal case wherein the defendant—or Mr. Roberts is the 
61 defendant—a criminal defendant charged with two first 
71 degree felony offenses—and although the State is the 
81 prosecuting agency through Mr. Skordas, the complainant in 
9 the case is the Department of Corrections—it is one of 
101 their officers who is the alleged victim in this matter and 
111 they provide the pool of person with whom witnesses for 
12 that very event come. 
13 Now, I'd like to address each of Mr. Miller's 
141 concerns in the following way. He indicates that this was 
15 insufficient or improper service made within a required 
16 time limit. The rules offering or governing issuance of 
17 subpoenas indicate that they must be served within 24 
18 hours. 
19 J Tour Honor, clearly one week before is a 
201 sufficient time within which to have those subpoenas 
2l| served. 
22 With regard to the manner of their service— 
231 THE COURTS Just a moment. Would you get—there 
24 is a paperback volume that says Utah Rules. It is in the— 



























THE COURT: Is it in Volume 4? I can never find 
it in Rule 4—what page, then? What rules? Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure? 
MS. WELLS: I don't think that governs the issue 
of subpoenas. I think that is probably in the civil cases. 
THE COURT: Let's find out what it says here. 
MR. KILLER: Look at Rule 14. 
MR. SKORDAS: 14. Look at Rule 14. 
MR. MILLER: 14(C). 
MR. SKORDAS: Of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
THE COURT: Rule 14? 
MR. SKORDAS: (b) and (c). 
MR. SKORDAS: Actually, your Honor, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure are no longer part of the Criminal Code. 
MS. WELLS: The rules are there. They are in a 
different place. 
THE COURT: I am in the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
MR. SKORDAS: After that. 
THE COURT: It is after that? 
MR. SKORDAS: Yes. Go to page 524. 
MS. WELLS: It is 523 or 24? It is 24? That's 
right. 
THE COURT: Okay. 5—oh, all right, now, Rule 
10 
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what? 14, did you say? 
MS. WELLS: It is Rule 14, your Honor. As I look 
at the rule in this manner, there is no time line stated 
governing the nature upon which the service is required. 
TOE COURT: Okay. 
MS. WELLS: My understanding has always been a 
24-hour period is necessary and required. Clearly that has 
been met. 
Now, your Honor, with regard to the manner in 
which the subpoenas were served, this court is certainly 
aware that the Department of Corrections personnel are in a 
secure type of setting. Those persons that are at the 
prison are personally unaccessable to any type of process 
server. 
Further, by analogy, I would indicate that the 
State, when it issues its subpoenas, does to police 
officers and corrections officials in the very exact manner 
in which service was effected by my representatives on 
behalf of the defendant. 
The Court must look at the particulars 
involving—the people involved to determine whether or not 
personal service is in any way available to us or if it is 
able to be achieved. 
THE COURT: Well, the rule—the very rule you 
cited me to says, "Service shall be made by delivering a 
11 
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1 copy of the subpoena to the witness or interpreter 
21 personally*" You are relying on the rule for one thing, 
3I then you're talking, let's take a look beyond the rule and 
41 see if this is really a reasonable thing on the other hand. 
51 MS. WELLS: Tour Honor, I would suggest to you 
61 that if we were required to serve each of these persons 
71 personally, then no subpoenas issued for witnesses within 
8] this district are ever properly served. Police are served 
9 in exactly the same manner. The State serves its subpoenas 
101 to all persons either by mail or by delivery to a 
111 receptionist, someone who can take those and deliver them. 
121 These persons are appearing in their capacity as officials 
131 of the Department of Corrections, therefore, this is the 
14I only meaningful type of service and it is consistent with 
15] the rule. 
161 If I could go on further though, and indicate to 
171 the Court or address some of the other issues. I don't 
181 think Mr. Miller is very familiar with the goings on of 
191 this case, since it was filed by the State some six or 
201 seven months ago. He points out we are late in issuing 
21I these subpoenas. The Court knows through conversations it 
221 has held in chambers with Mr. Skordas and I, which have 
231 necessitated two continuances of this case, it is because 




In one instance, Mr. Morgan, one of the very 
people who is subpoenaed here, for other reasons, kept us 
waiting for a period of six weeks without responding to us 
concerning his discussion with Mr* DeLand and other people. 
Pursuant to properly filed discovery motions, we have 
attempted to get each and all—each and every document and 
all documents pertaining to Mr. Robert's custody status and 
incarceration records through Carrie Hill, another attorney 
with the Department of Corrections, and to this date have 
not received that information. Therefore it is necessary 
to require, by subpoena, those very documents. 
Now, with regard to why these particular persons 
are necessary, your Honor, I have been representing Mr. 
Roberts since this matter was filed. I have had the 
opportunity to review a voluminous amount of information. 
I have, with him, determined that his defense to this 
alleged crime is one of compulsion which is authorized as a 
legal defense under the criminal code. I can cite you to 
the very definition of that. It is contained in 76-2-302. 
It indicates that, "A person is not guilty of an offense 
when he engaged in proscribed conduct because he was 
coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent use of 
unlawful physical powers." 
THE COURT: 76-2 what. 
MS. WELLS: 76-2-302. It is the first—well, it 
13 
Is the second delineated defense to criminal responsibility 
Included within the code. 
Now, Mr. Roberts' situation is rather unique in 
that he is not an ordinary citizen but is confined to the 
Utah State Prison. As this court has been aware, Mr. 
Roberts, while on parole status, was involved in the—or 
was criminally responsible for the injuries that were 
caused to a young lady, Miss LaDawn Prue. As a result of 
that incident in 1982, additional charges were filed 
against him and he has been incarcerated since that time. 
As a result of that peirticular incident, which involved Mr. 
Roberts' actions, which occurred as a result of Parole 
Board actions, which ultimately led to suit against the 
Utah State Prison, and those persons individually for 
malfeasance or acts in allowing his release, several of 
those Department of Corrections persons lost their jobs and 
as a result of that, Mr. Roberts has continued his 
incarceration under rather incredible and strict scrutiny 
because as a result of his actions there were personal 
actions taken against members of Department of Corrections. 
Since 1982, particularly, your Honor, I have 
reviewed the documents over eight years of incarceration 
which involve individually each of these persons who have 
been subpoenaed. Granted it is not now in their—perhaps 
in their present capacity, but their knowledge of this case 
14 
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1 involves actions or attempts by Mr. Roberts to secure some 
21 type of relief from the physical and safety threats that 
3 have been made against him during primarily the eight years 
4 since this occurred. In each of the instances the people 
51 who have been subpoenaed have direct involvement in them. 
61 As I say, perhaps not now in their present capacity, with 
71 regard to Mr. DeLand. 
81 THE COURTx When you say safety threats, you mean 
9I by other prisoners? 
101 MS. WELLS: Other prisoners. I intend to 
11] introduced a series of documents known as grievances in 
121 which Mr. Roberts, over that eight-year period, explained 
13 through the appropriate channels that his safety was in 
14 jeopardy, that threats were being made against him. That 
15 all goes to his state of mind and certainly is relevant to 
161 the defense of compulsion. 
17 Now, as I indicated, Mr. Franchina was a warden 
18I and the head of policies. Mr. Glazier is one of those 
191 persons who acted as representative of the Inspector 
201 General in denying requests and grievances that were raised 
211 by Mr. Roberts. Nick Morgan has also been personally 
221 involved since his assuming the position of Inspector 
23 General, directly involved in the case at hand in that he 
24I and representatives of his offices responded and were 
251 involved in the investigation of this particular offense to 
15 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
1 which he is charged. Mr. DeLand, despite his affidavit, 
21 has been involved not only in these attempted negotiations 
31 over the past seven months, but it was—and we have tapes 
41 that will show that Mr. Roberts at the time—that he was 
5 involved with the Utah State Prison guard, asked to speak 
61 to Mr. DeLand directly. 
7 It was only when he was informed that Mr. DeLand 
81 had been contacted and would be involving himself in the 
91 investigation, that this incident resolved itself and I 
10J would add without injury to any person. Mr. DeLand—and I 
111 have seen the corresponsence—has responded personally by 
121 corresponsence to Mr. Roberts, therefore, each of these 
131 persons—I can go on. I can tell you the relevance of each 
141 person's involvement if you wish me to do so. 
15J THE COURT: I do, go ahead. 
16I MS. WELLS: With regard to Gary DeLand, I just 
17 indicated I do not intend to call him for any purpose of 
181 dealing with him about these current negotiations, but 
19 rather I intend to call him to testify concerning his 
201 knowledge of the particular incident and his response 
211 thereto, which involved his sending personal correspondence 
221 to Mr. Roberts. Therefore he—and he is a critical, 
23 critical witness for that very reason. 
24 Mr. Morgan, as I have indicated to you, is now 
251 the Inspector General. He has been issued a Subpoena Duces 
16 
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II Tecum because the investigation of this matter was 
21 ultimately turned over to the Inspector General's office, 
31 and additionally, persons including Mr. Glazier and Ms. 
4I Phillips, as administrative hearing officers, were directly 
5 involved in the hearing of Mr. Roberts' grievances and 
61 their subsequent denial. So that addresses Nick Morgan. 
71 Nola Phillips and John Glazier—he also mentioned 
81 Jerry Cook and David Franchina—both of those individuals 
91 were previously wardens over the particular units that Mr. 
10 Roberts was housed at and have personal knowledge of the 
111 eight-year period of time that Mr. Roberts spent prior to 
121 this incident and can testify concerning their knowledge of 
13 threats made against him, subsequent investigations of that 
14 and subsequent disposition thereto. Those are the ones 
15| that have been mentioned by Mr. Miller. 
16 I would also indicate that there is no affidavit 
171 dealing with Ms. Phillips and so I think that it is not 
18 proper that he address any quashable subpoena by her, since 
191 there is no affidavit before you here on her behalf. 
201 THE COURTS Well, why would you want to call her? 
21I MS. WELLSx She is a hearing officer, your Honor. 
22 She has been directly involved in the denial and the 
23I disposition of at least five or six separate grievance 
241 forms indicating threats of force and physical safety that 
251 have been filed through appropriate channels by Mr. 
17 
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lj Roberts. Ms. Phillips is in the same position basically as 
21 Mr. Glazier in that they were both responsible for 
31 disposition of those forms. 
41 Tour Honor, if the Court wishes us to, if the 
5I Court is prepared to say these were not properly served, 
61 then I would indicate to you that in whatever manner we 
71 can, we will properly serve them. If we have to do that, I 
81 will send somebody out there to do it today. But it 
91 appears that these people are all on notice. 
10I The purpose of a subpoena is to give them 
11I appropriate and proper notice of their necessity to appear 
121 as a witness. I see no practical reason why we should, at 
13I this point on behalf of these people who indicated no good 
141 reason why they should not be required to testify, and deny 
151 this man his right to a fair and constitutionally protected 
161 trial, should otherwise have the benefit of saying that you 
171 did not personally serve me, although we know we got these 
18I and we are on notice as to what it is. That seems to me to 
191 be a manner in which justice would be granted and I suggest 
201 to you again that is the manner in which all subpoenas are 
21I served by the State because of the practical problems 
221 involved with serving people involved in law enforcement 
231 agencies. And each of these persons are associated with 
24I law enforcement albeit through the Department of 
25I Corrections* Again I reiterate the reason these went out 
18 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
1 seven days prior to trial rather than months before is 
21 because of the Department of Corrections' refusal to deal 
31 with us in a timely manner. And that I did note and Mr. 
4 Morgan will certainly remember, we waited six weeks for his 
51 last response which netted the court's continuing upon our 
6I request of this matter. And in fact, we have attempted to 
7 negotiate with the Department of Corrections until last 
8 week. 
9 Mr. Skordas would agree we have been in contact 
10 about that and it was only on probably Friday—in fact, I 
111 think Mr. DeLand was served on Friday—Thursday or Friday 
12 of this week, so his service would have been sooner—but it 
13 was only because of their indications that they would talk 
14 to us, but then their refusal to give us any answers that 
151 we have been forced at this time to say, all right, looks 
16 like the trial is on. We must go forward. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. 
18 Well, I'm going the quash the subpoenas. First 
19 of all, I do think the rule—it does say personal service 
201 and that's what it says, and so based upon that there is no 
211 personal service. The service of process—attempted 
221 service of process will be quashed. 
231 Secondly, I do think the amount of time was 
24 unreasonable. Under the circumstances, I know these 
25 are busy people and that doesn't justify not coming to 
19 
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lj court, even though it doesn't matter how important you are, 
2j President Nixon has to go testify if he has got evidence to 
31 be presented—but under the circumstances where this trial 
41 date has been set for some weeks, I think waiting until the 
51 last minute to serve the subpoenas is unreasonable. That's 
61 not enough notice. 
71 But more fundamentally than that, I am inclined 
81 to agree with Mr. Skordas' position on relevance of this 
91 testimony. I don't think the defense of compulsion is a 
101 viable defense as a matter of law in this case. I don't 
111 think the law is if you are being mistreated at the prison 
12| you are therefore justified in taking a hostage. That's 
131 just not the law. This statute was made for a situation 
141 where someone is threatened. If you don't commit this 
151 crime, if you don't wait for me in the get-away car, then I 
16I will shoot you, that kind of compulsion. Not the kind of 
17 compulsion we are talking about here. I think the 
181 testimony of these witnesses would be irrelevant. That 
191 defense is not available as a matter of law and I am not 
201 going to let you put on that evidence. 
211 I am just—even if you wanted to reserve them, I 
221 am just not going to make this a trial of the Department of 
231 Corrections. The issue here is going to be did he commit 
24| the crime or didn't he, and the subpoenas will be quashed. 
251 MS. WELLS: Tour Honor, based upon that I would 
20 
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II move to continue this trial* The Court has now undercut my 
2I entire defense. You have told me that I cannot present the 
31 defense that I have for months indicated, not only to the 
41 State but to the Court, that I intended to—intend to do. 
51 And I move for a continuance and I would intend to file 
61 some sort of interlocutory appeal of this court's decision 
71 on that matter. But under any circumstances, your Honor, I 
81 cannot go forward on Tuesday, to attempt to try this matter 
91 with the Court having now told me that I cannot present the 
10J defense intended. 
Ill THE COURT: Well, your client is entitled a 
121 speedy trial. 
13 MS. WELLS: He has waived it before. I am 
141 certain he will waive that again. 
15 THE COURT: Will you? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: All right. If you want to file an 
18 interlocutory appeal that might be the better way to do it 
19 if that's y o u r — 
20 MS. WELLS: Well, I am also requesting a 
21I continuance in order to do that. I am in a position where 
22 I need to do that. I will certainly do that in a timely 
231 manner, but I cannot do that at the same time as being 
241 concerned about beginning a trial on Tuesday with no 
251 defense and no witnesses. 
21 
THE COURT: Motion for a continuance is granted. 
Order that this case's trial date will be stricken. What 
do you want to do, set another trial date? 
MS. WELLS: Well, perhaps—I don't know. I am 
trying to think. 
THE COURT: I will give you a couple of days to 
think about and that get back to me. 
MS. WELLS: All right. 
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